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THE CASE OF THE LADY WHO RISKED EXPLODING 
A STUDY OF MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES AND CONTESTED VALUES 
 
(THE CASE OF THE LADY WHO RISKED EXPLODING) 
 
Bob Heyman (corresponding author, University of Huddersfield), Anthony 
McGrath (University of Bedfordshire), Piero Nastro (Homerton University 
Foundation NHS Trust), Theresa R.C. Lunniss (Homerton University Foundation 
NHS Trust) and Jacqueline P. Davies (City University, London). 
  
ABSTRACT  
 
This paper explores the role of value judgements in personal risk management through 
an in-depth case study involving a woman’s treatment for anal cancer. Julia 
(pseudonym) agreed to have her pre-treatment medical consultation recorded, and 
participated in two subsequent interviews. Delving into a single case makes it possible 
to understand why an individual makes decisions in relation to the overall nexus of risks 
and benefits which they identify even though their choices may seem irrational to 
others. According to the colorectal nurse research interviewer, Julia ‘risked exploding’ 
as a result of ‘absconding’ (her term) from hospital in order to have sex shortly after 
undergoing surgery. Although not to be interpreted literally, the above phrase 
encapsulates Julia’s risk blindness from a clinical perspective. The paper will address 
the question of how one person came to put herself at unnecessary risk. The question 
will be considered  in relation to non-communication about the interconnected web of 
issues which troubled Julia, including cosmology, mortality, being left with an unclean, 
leaky body, loss of economic viability, and harm to family members and to close 
relationships. This analytical framework complements the more usual one in which 
attitudes towards a particular risk object are compared across cases. The paper makes 
a contribution, within the limits of a single case study, to advancing knowledge about the 
neglected topic of individual risk consciousness. It will be argued that, in the absence of 
such analysis, personal decision-making about risks cannot be fully understood, 
appropriate advice given, or sensitive policies developed. 
  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The Royal Society (1992, p.1) defines risk as ‘the probability that a particular adverse 
event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge’. This 
formulation implicitly treats ‘adversity’ as an externally observable and measurable 
property of ‘events’. Reframing adversity in terms of negative valuing draws attention to 
the actively interpretive role of socially situated perceivers who 'ascribe values to 
negativities' (Rescher, 1983, p. 27, quoted authors emphasis). Furthermore, the  
representation of adversity as an intrinsic attribute of events implies that consequence 
sets can be unproblematically identified. The present paper will address the generally 
unexplored problematics of multi-attribute cost benefit analysis (Peterson, 2007) 
through a case study of how a woman (pseudonym Julia) selected and responded to 
the risk issues which troubled her during the course of her successful treatment for anal 
cancer.  
 
The specific focus of the paper is the intra- and interpersonal processes through which 
a single individual attempted to navigate a life-critical, partly self-generated nexus of 
risks and benefits. The question of how a person does actually combine multiple risk 
concerns has received relatively little attention in risk social science. This focus can be 
distinguished from two current research strands, the psychology of personal decision-
making and thematic qualitative risk research. A major focus for risk psychology has 
been the supposed inability of de-cultured ‘people’ to make rational decisions in 
conditions of uncertainty. This perspective which underpins a huge body of research is 
exemplified by Breakwell’s (2007, p. 79) assertion that ‘humans appear to fail miserably 
when it comes to rational decision-making’. The many failings identified from this 
standpoint, itself contested (Gigerenzer, 1996), include unrealistic optimism and 
reliance on misleading simplifications such as the availability heuristic (Slovic, 2000). 
This work raises the neglected issue of how consequences are to be identified 
(Peterson, 2007), and directs attention away from epistemological questions about 
rationality itself (Zinn, 2008). Crucially, it does not address the ways in which individuals 
do make decisions in relation to selected uncertain consequences which matter to 
them. Although individuals do not necessarily, or even usually, base decisions on 
conscious calculation (Bloor, 1995, p. 23), deliberative reflection does operate when 
new  critical choices must be made, as when facing a serious health problem for the first 
time.  
 
Thematic qualitative risk research has powerfully illuminated the diversity of social 
actors’ risk and non-risk interpretive frameworks across particular domains such as 
preventing a health problem. It avoids the twin traps, alluded to above, of stripping 
‘humans’ from their social context, and viewing their perspectives merely as deficits.  
One strand in this large body of work has investigated antagonisms between officially 
approved risk perspectives and those emerging from non-dominant sub-cultures. It can 
be illustrated only through ad hoc examples in a brief review. Gross (2010) has 
developed a case study of an Israeli, Jewish Orthodox woman who experienced strong 
health professional antagonism because she had declined to accept risky diagnostic 
testing of her unborn child, who turned out to have Down’s syndrome, despite screening 
at higher risk. Health professionals felt that she had been under an obligation to find out 
the chromosomal status of her offspring by taking the offered amniocentesis test even if 
she had ruled out terminating her pregnancy on religious grounds. Crawshaw and 
Bunton (2009) contrasted the official ‘logic of practice’ about illegal drug-taking with that 
of young men living in a deprived area of the UK who differentiated what they saw as 
recreational use of soft drugs and seriously risky addiction to heroin or crack cocaine. In 
this special issue, Caiata-Zufferey (2012) identifies a similarly valorised category 
differentiation among Swiss drug-users; and Barton-Breck and Heyman (2012) discuss 
the use of self-injury as a coping device.  
 
Other relevant work has been concerned with individuals’ thinking about multiple 
consequences across a defined population. For instance, African female sex workers 
have been shown to knowingly accept high risk of HIV infection in order to improve dire 
economic circumstances (Lees et al., 2009). Gay Australian men who opted for 
subsequent retroviral prophylaxis were found to undertake condomless sex despite 
perceiving an associated HIV risk because other considerations, such as the 
implications for an intimate personal relationship, outweighed health concerns (Körner, 
Hendry and Kippax, 2005).  
 
Thematic research sheds light on socially situated actors’ own reasons for not 
complying with official risk prescriptions. But this work tends not to address the 
complementary, more social psychological, question of how encultured individuals 
generate overall views of multiple uncertain consequences. Some work is cited below, 
and other studies unknown to the present authors undoubtedly explore individual 
grapplings with risk and multiple consequences. Desmond (2012) has studied the ways 
in which individuals living in rural Africa synthesise medicine with witchcraft. This 
syncretism generates combinatorial emergent properties such as fear about the 
perceived fatal consequences of injections being mistakenly used against witchcraft. In 
a developed country context, Brown’s (2008) analysis of communicative trust is 
particularly relevant to the present case study.  He argued that service users develop 
this form of trust if they believe that professionals are oriented towards their best 
interests, i.e. they identify value congruence. Julia experienced only fragile 
communicative trust because she feared that non-medical risk concerns which were 
vital to her were being discounted.  
 
Julia was presented with two antagonistic medical risks, each with different expectations 
attached to them: near certainty of cancer mortality in the absence of timely and 
probably effective medical intervention; and a 50% chance of having to live with a 
permanent stoma as a result of damage caused by the recommended radiotherapy-
chemotherapy cancer treatment. In addition, Julia expressed strong concerns about 
risked social consequences of her treatment, including  stress-related harm to family 
members, relationship breakdown and loss of livelihood. Two crucial and characteristic 
linked features of this consequence set are its wide heterogeneity and resulting 
incommensurability.   
 
Determining which ‘adverse events’ are to be included in multi-attribute risk analysis is 
the first problem for anyone attempting to make real-life decisions involving numerous 
consequencesi. Once consequences have been selected, it will almost always be 
necessary to weigh up combinations of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, i.e. the co-occurrence of 
positively and negatively valued, qualitatively distinctive, uncertain outcomes.  
 
Comparative valuations will vary personally, and will often be often ill-defined. 
Individuals are asked, in effect, to extrapolate to how they would feel if a particular 
contingency actually occurred. Living with a stoma provides a particularly good example 
of the a possible but unimaginable future. Furthermore, utility calculations require value 
conversions between consequences which are not only qualitatively distinctive, but also 
are associated with different expectations and time-frames. Peterson (2007, p. 81) 
concluded from an analysis of comparative value fuzziness, just one of the problematic 
issues which bedevil expected value quantification, that ‘our present theories of 
rationality are not sufficiently well-developed’. Case studies can shed light on the 
socially mediated processes through which individuals actually do select and calibrate 
multiple consequences when making personally critical decisions.  
 
The paper will draw upon a number of concepts, the meaning of which can only be 
briefly explicated. The term ‘rationality’ will be used to depict a social actor’s own 
reasoned explanation of their purposeful action, with no assumption that one analysis is 
better than another. Hence, the paper explores multiple rationalities. ‘Cosmology’ refers 
to ways of viewing human existence in relation to the material world, for example 
believing that outcomes express divine will, or that they are at least partly random. 
‘Risks’ are generated within an interpretive framework in which an observer’s 
uncertainty about events judged undesirable is projected onto the external world as 
chance (Heyman et al., 2010, p. 19). Individuals will be considered to ‘take a risk’ when 
they knowingly accept a perceived probability of experiencing an event which they 
deem adverse; and to put themselves ‘at risk’ when an observer believes that their 
action generates an unacceptably high probability of them experiencing an undesired 
event, whether knowingly or not. ‘Value’ refers to how desirable or undesirable an 
outcome is to particular social actors, and may vary between people, or for the same 
person at different timesii. Values may be more or less well articulated, and may remain 
ill-defined as when a patient contemplates what it might mean to live with a stoma. This 
starting point puts ‘emotions’ back into ‘objective data’ which may merely conceal the 
value presuppositions on which they are predicated (Bowker and Starr, 2000; Slovic, 
2012). 
 
The Clinical Background: Anal Cancer and its Treatment 
 
The term ‘anal cancer’ homogenises a range of malignancy types, most frequently 
squamous cell carcinoma, and cancer sites in the anus and anal canal. The anal cancer 
diagnostic category bifurcates an overlap with more prevalent, less treatable rectal 
cancers. Anal cancer is uncommon, with an overall annual incidence of about 1 per 
100,000 reported in England (Robinson, Coupland and Møller, 2009) and elsewhere. 
However, global incidence is increasing rapidly, probably through greater sexual 
transmission of the human papilloma virus (HPV)iii and immunodeficiency resulting from 
the spread of HIV and medical use of immunosuppresants (Ryan, Compton and Mayer, 
2000). Robinson, Coupland and Møller (2009) concluded that anal cancer is now more 
likely to affect women than men, a reversal of the previous trend, and that the average 
age of patients is declining. 
 
Overall survival rates for anal cancer are better than for those situated further up the 
colorectal system, and have progressively improved (Jeffreys et al., 2006). Similar 
trends have occurred internationally, although UK colorectal cancer treatment outcomes 
continue to lag behind those found in other European countries (Gatta et al., 2000); and 
Europe is behind the USA (Ciccolallo et al., 2005). Mortality risks are higher among 
older patients, and those from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds (Jeffreys et al., 
2006). However, the crucial survival factors are tumour progression and the 
development of metastases. In the USA, 80-90% of patients with stage one anal cancer 
(tumour <2cm in its greatest dimension) will survive treatment for more than five years, 
compared with less than 50% of those with stage three cancers (tumour > 5cm in its 
greatest dimension) (Wilkes and Hartshorn, 2009).  
 
Julia, the focus of the present case study, received the current gold standard curative 
intervention of chemotherapy plus radiotherapy. Prior to treatment, a temporary stoma, 
an opening, was created so that her faeces would bypass the cancer site into an 
external bag. The stoma was used to speed the healing process and reduce infection 
risk. This treatment package, a modern medical miracle, yields an 80-90% long-term 
survival rate for patients like Julia with early stage anal cancer, most of whom would 
otherwise have died, but comes at a price. Some patients experience significant 
defecation and associated psychological problems after stoma removal (Taylor and 
Morgan, 2011), with over half of one study sample reporting serious difficulties a year 
later (Siassi et al., 2008). Overall, their respondents experienced more problems after 
stoma removal than they had anticipated, an indication of possible patient over-
optimism and/or surgeons underreporting likely problems. This finding resonates with 
Julia’s fear that her partner/boyfriendiv and surgeon might be underestimating the 
downside in order to present life-saving surgery as favourably as possible.  
 
About half of treated patients whose temporary stoma has been removed  eventually 
require a permanent one to be installed (Siassi et al., 2008). The chance of this 
happening may be increased by the use of radiotherapy, creating a trade-off between 
mortality and quality of life risks (Lange et al., 2007; Bruheim et al., 2010). Those facing 
this risk at the time of surgery have to confront the sheer impossibility of imagining what 
it would be like personally and socially to live with such a radical bodily modification 
over the shorter and longer term. Patients in aggregate may overestimate the adversity 
of subsequently living with a permanent stoma (Bossema et al., 2007), and some of the 
early problems appear to abate after a year of usage (Grumann et al., 2001). Julia’s 
negative feelings about the risk of having to live with a permanent stoma are discussed 
below.  
 
THE CASE STUDY 
 The present case study involves the experiences of a woman in her early 40s during the 
year (2006) in which she was diagnosed with, and successfully treated for, anal cancer. 
The data were obtained from audio-recording and transcribing: the pre-operation 
medical consultation at which her partner/boyfriend was present; a pre-operation 
interview undertaken shortly afterward; and a post-treatment interview, carried out in 
November 2006. Data collection was undertaken by one of the paper authors, an 
experienced colorectal nurse academic. The data derive from a wider mixed methods 
study of living with a stoma (Nastro et al., 2010), for which UK NHS ethical approval 
was granted. Julia gave specific consent for her case to be presented in a paper. 
Personal details about individuals included directly or indirectly in the case study have 
been changed to protect their anonymity. 
 
Direct generalisations cannot be derived from a single case study. This one was not 
chosen on account of its typicality, since very few patients ‘abscond’ from hospital to 
have sex immediately after abdominal surgery. The case was selected because of its 
relevance to the question of why an individual might act in a way which others consider 
rashly dangerous. In addition, Julia was exceptionally articulate, and very willing to 
share her experiences. Although not representative, single case studies allow risk to be 
understood biographically in relation to one person’s wider life.  
 
Julia’s year with cancer 
 
A timeline for clinical interventions, outcomes and research events is provided in Table 
One below. 
 
INSERT TABLE ONE HERE (see attachment) 
 
Julia’s treatment trajectory began when she visited her GP, in December 2005, with 
what she thought might be piles. Within a month, she had undergone an investigation 
under anaesthetic for suspected colorectal cancer. The results, which came back a 
fortnight later, indicated that she had a more treatable anal cancer. Julia was advised 
that chemotherapy combined with radiotherapy would offer her a 90% chance of 
survival. She was informed that she would have to rely on a colostomy bag for several 
months, and that she faced a 50% probability of needing one permanently. In February 
2006, Julia spent ten days in hospital for an operation in which a temporary stoma was 
created. When the stoma had settled down, she underwent a 13 week programme of 
radiotherapy and chemotherapy (March to June 2006). After undergoing tests which 
showed that the cancer had been cleared, the stoma was closed in August 2006. Julia 
was considered to have made a complete recovery, and was able to begin a new job in 
December 2006. The data analysis below will explore this experience from Julia’s 
perspective. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
During the treatment process, Julia expressed strong concern about the risk of 
eventually having to live with a permanent stoma. She was also anxious about the 
reactions of her sixteen year old son who sat his GCSEs that summer, the impact on 
the health of her frail elderly mother, and maintaining her relationship with her 
partner/boyfriend. Because the treatment left her too ill to work for most of the year, 
Julia was forced to close her business and live on state benefits. Despite holding a 
predominantly secular world view, Julia wrestled with the wider meaning of her affliction, 
considering it as possibly a punishment from God for various transgressions about 
which she felt guilty. This non-risk interpretive framework coexisted uneasily in her mind 
with a medical perspective. Immediately after the stoma removal, Julia ‘absconded’ from 
hospital and had sex with her partner/boyfriend whilst her stitches were still in place. 
Her action can be understood as a spectacular lapse in responsible risk self-
management, an assertion of autonomy, and as a response to the  repeated failures, 
outlined below, of those around her to acknowledge her multiple risk concerns. 
 
Disease as God’s punishment  
 
Julia participated to some extent in religious practice, although she held predominantly 
secular views. Nevertheless, like many people who experience serious disease, 
particularly cancer, she considered the possible cosmological meaning of her condition, 
as documented below. 
 
Julia: Now I knew what a colostomy was because [relative of person she knew] 
had one last year. And I, in my normal delightful way, had gone, “Uhr, how 
revolting. How can anybody live with that?” And so, you know, it felt like 
punishment, due punishment when I got told I was going to have to have one 
[colostomy]. And I said, “But I can’t. I’m only young” ... I cried ... So, by the time I 
got to see her [the consultant], I knew I was probably - life and that - I might as well 
just get on with it. So that’s the way I greeted the information. (Post-treatment 
interview) 
 
Consideration of her illness as divine retribution was linked to the notion that it had 
occurred at such a young agev. However, Julia then noted that her attitude quickly 
shifted to one of resigned acceptance. She also discussed other sources of guilt which 
she felt might be bringing divine punishment down on her, whilst at the same time 
dismissing this explanation as irrational.  
 
Julia: I suppose I do think it is a punishment, but I also know that is fantasy … if 
this was a punishment it would be perfectly fair, but death, death isn’t fair [Laughs]. 
(Pre-surgery interview) 
 
Despite rejecting the notion of divine retribution as fantasy, Julia still weighed the level 
of punishment on imaginary scales of justice, suggesting that death would be an 
excessive penalty for her transgressions, whereas illness and suffering would be ‘fair’. 
This tension between personalistic and science-based cosmologies can also be seen in 
the next quotation which partly recast divinity in terms of the ill person’s own 
unconscious mind. 
 
Julia: It’s a very difficult one indeed because, even if I don’t think I’m being 
punished by God, I certainly feel that there’s an unconscious which could provide 
this kind of counterweight to my own behaviours. Oh yes. So whether we query 
God or the unconscious, I certainly think these things can operate, and I don’t think 
it’s superstitious ... I mean, I’m also a pragmatist in so far as you can take one look 
out of the window and see the whole planet crawling with people like bacteria ... 
You know, populations come and go, they live and die, they eat each other up, we 
kill each other, that’s the way humans are. That’s the way creatures are. There has 
to be illness. Otherwise the planet would have exploded, you know, thirty centuries 
ago. Humanity wouldn’t have lasted at all without illness. Of course, it belongs to 
the realm of the physical. But perhaps it’s the only choice of illness might be 
determined by my unconscious. I have no idea. (Post-treatment interview) 
 
The first part of this instructive reflection, given after Julia knew that she had recovered, 
conditionally reframed the possible non-randomness of illness as an outcome of 
unarticulated personal agency. Julia then challenged her own person-centric account of 
illness by shifting to a large-scale Darwinian perspective in which disease serves to 
promote species survival. This interpretive framework invoked the blind working of 
chance. Finally, all three accounts of illness, in terms of divine punishment, the 
projection of unconscious guilt and population survival, were brought into juxtaposition 
when Julia raised the possibility that only the type of illness is determined by ‘choice’. 
The coda reopened uncertainty about whether health problems result from divine will, 
unconscious personal guilt, the rolling out of evolutionary processes, or a combination 
of these disparate explanatory schema. The uncertainty about the meaning of her 
illness which Julia articulated so well may be characteristic of cultures in which risk-
oriented science and religion co-exist as explanatory schema (Coleman and White, 
2009). It provided the backdrop for Julia’s selection and consideration of other adverse 
consequences of her illness and its treatment.  
 
Mortality and morbidity risks 
 
From a purely medical perspective, Julia faced two types of risk: firstly that she might 
die during surgery, or afterwards if the cancer recurred; and, secondly, that she might 
be left needing a permanent stoma, an outcome which would lead to her and others 
repeatedly encountering her faeces. These two risks had a counter-indicative 
relationship to each other since she could not reduce her mortality risk without 
accepting the risk of needing a stoma for the rest of her life.  
 
Mortality risk 
 
Julia placed her risk of dying in the context of ‘other hazards’ which, as discussed 
further below, related most directly to being left with a permanent stoma.  
 
Julia: I do know I can die [in surgery], but, apart from that, I don’t know about any 
other hazards, but dying would simply be to do with accidents, as it were. I am 
assuming that that is the case. It would not be particularly to do with - because it’s 
a stoma?  
Interviewer: No, no.  
Julia: It would just be because of the hazards of an anaesthetic, yes? (Pre-surgery 
interview) 
 
In the above quotation, Julia framed her chance of surviving surgery purely in terms of 
chance. Here she employed the cosmology of randomness which co-existed with those 
invoking divine justice and the working of the unconscious mind, discussed above. 
Julia’s query to the colorectal nurse research interviewer asked him to confirm that the 
creation of a temporary stoma did not itself carry a specific mortality risk. The immediate 
risk of dying could be apportioned entirely to surgery, and so located in the category of 
routine, and therefore safe, operations. Her request for reassurance from the research 
interviewer after the pre-surgery consultation had taken place indicated that she had 
been living with uncommunicated worry about this risk. It can be distinguished from that 
of longer-term cancer mortality, first raised by her partner/boyfriend, Donald, in the pre-
surgery consultation. 
 
Donald: Is she likely to completely recover or is it likely to recur? 
Ms S: (consultant): No.              
Donald: Is it likely to spread? (Pre-surgery consultation) 
 
This difference between Julia and Donald in outcome time-framing perhaps reflected 
the distinctive concerns of patients contemplating major surgery who focus on 
immediate survival and those close to them who are primarily oriented to the risk of 
losing a valued relationshipvi. The consultant (Ms S) responded to this question by 
attempting to quantify probability, but quickly floundered.  
 
Ms S: I don’t have the numbers at my fingertips. It might be better if I can refer to 
them and give you the correct information when you come in on Monday? 
Julia: About what? Prognosis?  
Ms S: The viable prognosis and all that sort of thing. What is the ballpark that you 
are aiming? 
Donald: Julia has been told something already, but it’s - 
Julia: I have been told about 95%. Is that true? 
Ms S: I, I - 
Julia: No, you should be cautious. I know that. 
Ms S: I would have to be realistic, that I would be making it up on a, a wing and a 
prayer, and I don’t think ... I would like to have a look at some of the studies to be 
able to give you a more correct ... 
Donald: Should we, as it were, be hopeful and expect a positive outcome as we 
start all this? 
Ms S: Absolutely. It’s well over 50% ... but I, I, I don’t want to tell you 70% if you 
have been told 95%. I would like to be able to give you the results of how many 
people have to have surgery after the operation. 
Donald: All that stuff.  
Ms S: All that sort of stuff. (Pre-surgery consultation) 
 
The discussion of probabilities was complicated by the number of outcomes which they 
could have referred to, including surgery mortality, requiring further cancer treatment, 
longer-term cancer mortality, and needing a permanent stoma. The consultant’s 
opening statement about ‘numbers’ backgrounded this question, treating risk as a 
directionless object, a tacit manoeuvre characteristic of naturalistic risk thinking. Julia’s 
sharp follow-on question, ‘About what?’, challenged this backgrounding, drawing 
attention to the multiplicity of outcomes under consideration. Ms S’s response directed 
the discussion of probabilities to ‘viable prognosis and all that sort of thing’. She thereby 
foregrounded mortality risk, itself a source of multiple meanings depending on the time-
scale considered, whilst leaving open the potential consideration of other issues. Her 
risk frame shifted at the end of the quoted interaction to the need for follow-up surgery 
which could refer to further cancer treatment or the need to fit a permanent stoma. 
Hence, the striving for probability quantification was undermined by confusion about 
which risk object was being measured. 
 
Although opting to pose the question of individual recovery in quantitative terms, Ms S 
felt unable to cite a numerical probability of survival, postponing pronouncement until 
she could look up the statistics. She was particularly concerned to avoid undermining 
the credibility of the whole risk management process by contradicting other probabilistic 
information which Julia might have been given, thereby inadvertently highlighting its 
unreliability. The rather odd question about ‘aiming’ for a ‘ballpark’ invited her patient to 
indicate a mortality probability which she would consider acceptable. It might seem 
surprising that the consultant felt that she needed to consult the studies before offering 
a number. But the issue under discussion was by no means straightforward.  
 
Whilst declining to offer precise quantification, the consultant attempted to frame the 
chance of survival optimistically as above 50%, which she pointed out might mean 70% 
or 95%. These figures, she implied, provided a clear pragmatic justification for 
undergoing treatment. Ultimately, risk management decisions require a binary choice 
between taking or not taking a considered line of action. Imprecision about 
consequence probabilities does not prevent decision-making from being guided by them 
providing that one alternative is clearly preferable across multiple risks. Donald 
attempted to background the multiplicity of risk concerns at issue as ‘all that stuff’, 
offering Ms S an escape which she gratefully accepted by echoing his words. As 
documented below, both Donald and Ms S wanted Julia to consent to a package of 
medical interventions about which she expressed reservations. The uncertain status of 
the probabilities in question fuelled their contention. This highly instructive interchange 
epitomises the fault lines of risk-based cultures which raise quantitative probabilistic 
questions that can only be answered at best to a limited extent. 
 
The risk of needing a permanent stoma 
 
Crucially for the purpose of the present paper which focuses on the issue of valuing 
multiple qualitatively distinctive consequences, Julia responded immediately to the 
above dialogue between the consultant and her partner/boyfriend by raising a different 
issue, that of her state after surgery. 
 
Julia: What my mother wants to know, and I suppose [partner/boyfriend] wants to 
know as well, and I would prefer not to know, but I suppose that I have got to 
know, is what kind of aftercare I am going to need, once after this operation? It 
sounds like none. 
Donald: Yes. Julia’s mother asked to ask this one. 
Julia: Yes, actually because she wants me to go [into treatment], and it’s no way, 
unless I really - [Ms S laughs.] (Pre-surgery consultation) 
 
The abrupt shift in risk orientation which Julia imposed on the consultation conveyed her 
worry about her functional state after surgery, thereby subverting Donald and Ms S’s 
focus on long-term cancer survival. Julia at this point suggested that she felt pressured 
by those close to her into accepting treatment, and thereby increasing her survival 
chances, at the expense of being left disabled. She tailed off in a way which left open 
the specification of the adverse consequences which would preclude her accepting the 
offered treatment. The consultant’s laughter indicated unease at this impasse, rather 
than humour. As documented below, Julia did not seriously contemplate declining a 
medical package which offered a good prospect of avoiding almost certain cancer death 
at the price of accepting a high, 50% probability of having to live with a permanent 
stoma. But she resisted attempts to persuade her to background treatment side-effects. 
She was also affirming her personal autonomy in the face of benevolent attempts to 
entice her onto a trajectory which would reduce her risk of early death at the cost of 
exposing her to other risks.  
 
Julia had strong feelings of revulsion about living with a stoma which related to concern 
about her sexual attractiveness and, in turn, to maintaining relatively precarious close 
relationships, discussed in a later section. 
 
Julia: I think it’s [a stoma is] the most hideous and revolting thing, and I don’t want 
it.  
Interviewer: OK.  
Julia: However, I would prefer to live. 
Interviewer:  OK. 
Julia: I’m not so sure, you know, I don’t know if I would prefer to live with no sex 
life. And I don’t know if I would ever be able to persuade a man to fuck me, excuse 
my language, with a stoma. Would you?  
[Long pause]  
Julia: I really don’t know, because it’s really bad news.  
Interviewer: Right. Apart from the sexual aspects, is there anything else? 
Julia: No. (Pre-surgery interview) 
 
This dialogue contained a blackly comic violation of conversational norms which 
silenced the disconcerted male colorectal nurse research interviewer. His abrupt topic 
change effectively censored the topic, leading Julia to bluntly decline his invitation to 
open up a new one. Prior to the interview, she had received a similarly inconclusive 
answer in the pre-treatment consultation. 
 
Ms S: We would expect you to continue with your normal life [after treatment].  
Julia: A fully normal life, apart from having sex and living that kind of normal life, 
which I assume I won’t be able to do? 
Ms S: No, we would - I think, once your undercarriage has healed up.  
Julia: I was looking forward to finding out the name of the whole business. 
Ms S: Perineum is the posh word. Let me explain to you. I am currently doing a 
study on female sexual function after both radiotherapy and surgery to the pelvis. 
They [women] had [problems] with penetration, vaginal dryness, loss of interest in 
sex, alteration of body image and anorgasmia. 
Julia: There is no actual, observable, measurable damage? 
Ms S: I am absolutely honest in saying that we really don’t know what it is for 
women. (Pre-surgery consultation)  
 
The euphemistic referral to her ‘undercarriage’ again took the focus of the discussion 
away from Julia’s embodied concern about her sexual attractiveness after stoma-
forming surgery. This issue was bound up with multiple uncertainties about whether she 
would need a permanent stoma and how others might respond to its presence. The 
consultant’s evasiveness appears similar to the nurse interviewer’s silence and topic 
change, outlined above. Julia could have reasonably concluded that her expressed 
concern about this issue would not be addressed. Furthermore, the problem  which she 
raised was not her own sexual functioning, the matter addressed by the consultant, but 
her ability to maintain an intimate relationship with a male partner. Her question about 
observable damage reflected this preoccupation, further documented below, as did her 
interrogation of the male interviewer about whether he would hypothetically view a 
woman carrying a stoma as a candidate for sexual intercourse. Such subtle reframings 
between multiple risk objects can easily be overlooked. 
 
Wider social consequences 
 
Julia’s concerns about contingencies arising from treatment extended beyond her body. 
She also gave considerable attention to the indirect social consequences of treating her 
condition. These consequences will be considered in relation to her mother, her son, 
her livelihood and her relationship with her partner/boyfriend. The main aim of the 
analysis is not to demonstrate this obvious point, but to explore the interplay of multiple 
risk concerns. 
 Julia’s analysis of medical risk extended beyond her own survival to that of her frail, 
elderly mother.  
 
Julia: From that moment on [colorectal cancer suspected], I believed that I was 
likely about 50% to die from cancervii. And the biggest fear was my telling my 
mother who has a medical weakness. And I really, really, I actually thought that 
she might die of a heart attack, not just react badly but die, because of the 
knowledge (Pre-surgery interview) 
 
At the time when she thought she might have colorectal cancer, Julia, according to her 
own account, felt more anxious about her mother dying from shock than about her own 
prospects. As this quotation demonstrates, even medical risk management, viewed from 
the patient’s perspective, can extend  beyond the individual who is being treated.  
 
Julia also worried about the impact of her recovery from treatment on the emotional 
health of her adolescent son.  
 
Julia: So I like to think that I am going to be well enough to at least look and sound 
-  even if I don’t get up in the morning to get him off to school, I don’t want him to 
come home to a sick and miserable-looking mother. 
Ms S: I think you are better off to prepare him that he will come home to a sick and 
miserable mother.  
Donald: Sick and miserable mother? 
Ms S: But he will come home to his mother ... I would personally quite like him [to 
meet with me]. 
Donald: … We said he should go and stay with his father but then he said, “I 
would rather stay, stay with [Julia]”. 
Julia: No, no. Well actually, no. He didn’t say, “I would rather stay with mum”. He 
said, “I don’t want to stay with dad”. It’s not the same. 
Donald: That’s interesting. He doesn’t want to stay with your mother, does he? 
Julia: My mother? You must be joking! (Pre-surgery consultation) 
 
In response to Julia’s expression of concern about the impact of her treatment on her 
son, Ms S employed the dramatic device of emphasising adverse consequences, ‘a sick 
and miserable-looking mother’. Such violation of the more usual euphemistic medical 
practice (in which agony may be labelled ‘discomfort’!), invited a query, duly supplied by 
Donald, which the consultant then rebutted by arguing that a sick mother was preferable 
to a dead one. This rhetorical device was intended to bring home the overriding benefit 
of accepting medical intervention. Ms S. then attempted to reduce the adversity of  the 
impact on Julia’s son by proposing to meet him, an offer which was ignored. Donald’s 
proposals about alternative care-taking arrangements supported this endeavour. By 
sharply and satirically rejecting his suggestions, Julia sustained her perception of the 
adversity of her treatment for her son. She thereby kept in play the question of whether 
she would accept treatment. In the subsequent pre-surgery interview, she reiterated this 
concern: 
 
Julia: I don’t want him to see that I’m ill, so that also. I don’t want him to see a 
droopy, tired, smelly mother. That bothers me. (Pre-surgery interview)  
 
Julia’s anxiety about another consequence of treatment, for her economic 
circumstances, fuelled tension with her consultant.  
 
Julia: Well what I’ve said to my patients, I’m intending to work, returning to work 
fully and well in September. 
Ms S: I think that’s slightly unrealistic.  
Julia: Do you? 
Ms S: I do. The chemotherapy in my understanding, well, goes on a good six 
months. 
Julia: Hang on. Well, this is what I have not been informed about. This pisses me 
off. I’m sorry. This makes me angry [louder voice]. (Pre-surgery consultation) 
 
The unexpected length of her invalidity trajectory forced Julia to take the potentially 
irreversible step of closing down her practice.  
 
Julia: Now luckily, it seems that those who are employed can work here and there 
for a few hours. Unfortunately, because I am self-employed, nobody but me can. I 
can’t hand it over to a substitute. I’ve actually had to close my practice, which 
means that there is nothing to go back to. There is no work to do. (Pre-surgery 
interview)  
  
Julia’s fear that she would lose her livelihood proved well-founded in the short term, 
although she eventually found improved employment. 
 
Julia: The biggest problem has been ending ... my practice. And then, so, I had to 
be on income support because I had no money other than what I earned, and that 
was horrible. And, and then, when I got my clean bill of health, I’ve had to go on 
Job Seeker’s Allowance. And now, thank God ..., I’ve got a job ..., and I’m working 
as a [therapist], and it’s fantastic ... But I didn’t know that, and it just seems like, 
kind of, a gift from God because I really didn’t expect that. So that would have 
been the worst outcome, that I would have been kind of sentenced to, sort of, 
poverty really. (Post-treatment interview) 
 
Julia pointed out that she could not have anticipated that she would end up in improved 
employment circumstances after abandoning her previous work. Despite her 
predominantly secular belief system, Julia framed her unexpectedly favourable outcome 
as a gift from God. Similarly, the idea of being ‘kind of sentenced’ to poverty invoked the 
calibration of adverse social consequences on an imagined scale of divine justice. 
However, these statements may have been used more or less as a metaphor for  
unexpectedly good fortune, rather than as a literal depiction of divine intervention.  
 Julia’s negative feelings about undergoing life-saving treatment were bound up with her 
fear about the impact of bodily mutilation on her sexual relationships. This issue went 
well beyond sex per se, to the sustainability of an intimate personal relationship, as 
mentioned previously. 
 
Julia: I want to be seen as a sexual woman to the man in my life, … and it [stoma] 
has a kind of association to a penis, and it doesn’t feel like it belongs to a woman. 
Plus, all that kind of medical stuff. I mean, to me, medicine and sex don’t go 
together. And because I have a lover and not a husband - again, if I had a 
husband who, you know, was the kind of person that I screamed at, or took the 
rubbish out for me, it might be more manageable. But the fact is it being a lover, it 
was out of the question.  
Interviewer: Why? 
Julia: Because I prefer to keep them in sugar, and I don’t want them to know this 
kind of thing about me. All the secrets … I don’t mind him seeing my bad self, but 
a very bad body, yeah, I do mind, I mind a lot ... To actually see the wound or help 
me dress it would have been out of the question. That was far too private. (Post-
treatment interview) 
 
Julia’s concerns about keeping her partner in ‘sugar’ and concealing her leaky, 
damaged body resonate with feminist analyses of the sociology of the body (e.g. Grosz, 
1994). However, Julia viewed her body-presentation in terms of relationship insecurity 
rather than gender, contrasting her present circumstance with that of having a husband 
who could be ‘screamed at’, or who ‘took the rubbish out for me’. The overriding, 
gendered importance to Julia of maintaining the image of a good body was conveyed by 
its prioritisation over displaying a ‘bad self’. 
 
Risking an Explosion 
 
Julia ‘absconded’ from hospital shortly after her final operation. By having sex with 
stitches still in place, she put herself at risk, according to the colorectal nurse 
interviewer, of her insides metaphorically ‘exploding’. Julia’s retrospective summary 
account of this event is presented below. 
 
Julia: I’m a very, very, very restless person, and throughout my treatment I’ve 
been peculiarly energetic. And when I had the last operation … I was just as 
hyper-manic.  And I kept getting out of bed.  And my son had been away for a 
month, and he came home … so I just left the hospital the day after the operation 
and came home … I came home and had sex with my boyfriend … I’d absconded 
from the hospital without telling anybody, and really upsetting them. (Post-
treatment interview) 
 
Julia explained her state of mind in quasi-psychiatric terms as ‘hyper-mania’. However, 
her restlessness may also have been linked to her risk concerns outlined above, 
including developmental harm to her son, whose return triggered her absconsion, 
exacerbated by others’ evasions of the issues which she raised.   
 
Julia suffered severe pain whilst at home after absconding, and felt guilt and shame 
when she returned to hospital the next day to be admonished by nursing staff. 
 
Julia: And I got up [after sitting with son, subsequent to absconding and having 
sex with boyfriend], and I had a pain, and … it was excruciating. And I, because I 
felt so guilty at having absconded … and I felt ashamed.  And the nurses, I have to 
say [after she returned], … were bloody awful. (Post-treatment interview) 
 
Julia’s further retrospective reflections about her underlying reasons for ‘absconding’ 
were expressed in the next quotation. 
 
Interviewer: Why did you want to abscond? 
Julia: … Well, I suppose, partly, I wanted to be annoying and disruptive. It’s quite 
possible, ‘cos there’s an anger in me, ‘cos I felt well.  I mean I should know, up 
here [in head], if I’m not well. But I think it didn’t really sink in that it was a so-called 
‘major operation’, whatever a ‘major operation’ is … And so my tenant is … an ex-
nurse … and the sensible sort. And so, she was saying afterwards, “Oh well, yes, 
you know, this is a major operation, and they pull you about on the operating 
theatre, and perhaps they put you back in a funny way”…  
Interviewer: Well, do you understand what they did to your bowel? 
Julia: Only just, but I couldn’t see why it would cause me to take my rest more 
seriously than any other operation.  And given, they didn’t say to me, “Even if you 
feel well, stay in bed”, and, to be honest, I don’t know if I should have stayed in 
bed … They could have let me know that even if I felt well, I should have strapped 
myself to the bed, ‘cos I don’t know to this minute if it’s true or not. (Post-treatment 
interview) 
 
This rich quotation raises a number of questions. It might be concluded that Julia did not 
intentionally ‘take a risk’ even though health professionals believed that she had ‘put 
herself at risk’. As conveyed by the conversation with her tenant, Julia had not fully 
taken in the seriousness of the surgical procedure which she had undergone, and had 
experienced a disjuncture between her bodily feelings of wellness and the  status as an 
invalid which others ascribed to her. Julia expressed regret that she had not been 
explicitly informed about the necessity of staying in her hospital bed. However, the 
angry responses of nursing staff conveyed a governmental response to risk, i.e. that a 
responsible person should not have required such advice to be spelt out. Julia’s account 
of feeling guilty when she experienced pain at home does suggest that she understood 
before returning to hospital that she had intentionally violated a well-understood 
although unstated social norm, perhaps motivated by the anger which she mentioned. 
 
Uncertainty about the consequences of this post-surgical adventure added to the 
conundrum. The non-occurrence of an adverse event does not per se confer absolution 
from the charge of irresponsible risk-taking. Conversely, an unwanted outcome does not  
demonstrate that a risk should not have been taken. The severe pain which Julia 
experienced during her unauthorised home visit continued into the recovery period, but 
was abating at the time of the post-treatment interview. Julia wondered whether it might 
be due to sciatica and therefore unconnected to the surgery or her absconsion. 
 
Julia: And, to be honest I don’t know if I should have stayed in bed, ‘cos I don’t 
know if that’s what [brought on] the sciatica … So the day after I went home, I think 
I’d taken one of my chairs to the consulting room, so I sat on a stool, in this 
position, having this conversation with my son.  I’ve no idea. I mean, how do I 
know what caused it [pain]?  It’s seemed to me because I have a permanent lack 
of chairs. (Post-treatment interview) 
 
Whether medically valid or not, explaining her subsequent pain in terms of the risk 
factor-outcome link absence of chairs-sciatica absolved Julia from having actually 
caused herself suffering through acting rashly. Although others saw her as irresponsibly 
putting herself at risk, her actions need to be understood in the context of the other risks 
which troubled her, together with the failures of her attempts to discuss these risks with 
others.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
From a purely medical perspective, Julia was offered a modern miracle, a high 
probability of being cured of an otherwise mostly fatal disease with a 50% chance of full 
functional recovery. Although she agreed to take the treatment trajectory, and indeed 
had little real choice if she wanted to survive, Julia by no means totally welcomed this 
flawed gift of science. None of the diverse risks which troubled her actually occurred, 
although she did experience post-operative severe pain. Retrospectively, Julia 
unreservedly welcomed the treatment she had received. However, prospective 
visualisation of contingencies which might come to pass shaped Julia’s emotions and 
communications with others at the time that her treatment plan was being resolved and 
implemented. Julia feared that even if she recovered completely and quickly, she might 
suffer permanent knock-on consequences. These concerns arose ultimately from Julia’s 
precarious position in the wider society as a self-employed, unmarried female parent 
with an elderly mother.  
 
Many patients given a re-diagnosis from colorectal to anal cancer would welcome a 
higher chance of cancer survival, and background other risks. Julia declined to discount 
risked adverse consequences of the proposed cancer treatment, but instead articulated 
them to the discomfort of her partner/boyfriend and consultant. As documented in the 
data analysis, both offered solutions to the question of temporary care for her 
adolescent son which she dismissively rebutted. Her expressed concerns about her 
sexual attractiveness whilst living with a stoma, and about the implications for the 
sustainability of her relationships, were met with uncommunicative stone-walling. 
Understandably, healthcare staff and carers seek to minimise anxiety about unwanted 
consequences because they wish to ensure that the patient accepts necessary 
interventions in as good a frame of mind as possible. Nevertheless, a degree of 
defensiveness can be detected, particularly in relation to the juxtaposition of dirt and 
sexuality (Douglas, 1966). In response, Julia may have used her emphasis on adverse 
contingencies to sustain a sense of autonomy against a campaign by her doctor and 
those close to her to persuade her to suppress her doubts about unreservedly 
welcoming life-saving treatment.  
 
The case study illustrates a more general trend for health care professionals to attach 
less negative value to the side effects of treatments than do their recipients. In relation 
to cancer care, a reluctance ‘to acknowledge, that a proportion of people will struggle 
day to day with relatively minor problems that collectively over time may become 
debilitating’ (Maher and Mankin, 2007, p. 743) has been identified. Similarly, a tendency 
for physicians to underestimate adverse effects of antidepressants (Kikuchia et al., 
2011) has been reported. Julia’s challenging statements notwithstanding, she accepted 
that she had to participate in the gold standard treatment package. Her emphasis on 
inconvenient truths might be dismissed as a merely token rebellion. However, others’ 
lack of engagement with what they might have viewed as side-issues provided the 
context in which Julia put herself at serious risk from the perspective of health 
professionals by ‘absconding’ immediately after surgery. What might have happened if 
the issues which she raised had been acknowledged cannot be known. This example 
provides a reminder that health professionals should not make the assumption that a 
patient, even one with curable cancer, will necessarily be oriented solely or primarily 
towards survival.  
 
Most research into expected value has been concerned with its attempted 
quantification, in fields such as health economics (Nord, 1999); or, from a psychological 
perspective which identifies supposed rationality deficits such as unrealistic optimism 
and reliance on the availability heuristic (Breakwell, 2007, p. 79). Qualitative sociological 
research has mostly highlighted discrepancies between official and minority risk 
perspectives (e.g. Crawshaw and Bunton, 2009). These  strands of work do little to 
illuminate the processes through which individuals develop their own rationalities when 
confronting  difficult critical decisions involving multiple consequences, the impact of 
which is difficult or impossible to anticipate in advance. The present case study provides 
a window onto such socially situated but personal processes.  
 
Claims to typicality cannot be made for single case studies. Julia stands out as 
articulate, challenging and determined to own her own life. The importance of case 
studies arises not from their representativeness, but from their potential to draw out 
phenomena of universal significance. The present study illuminates the general 
problems which arise when decision-making entails grappling with multiple risks and 
benefits. In relation to the theme of the present special issue of Health, Risk & Society, 
the two particularly relevant problems with utilitarian rationality which have been 
highlighted involve consequence selection and value fuzziness (Peterson, 2007). An 
adequate analysis of consequence selection needs to encompass not only direct but 
also identified indirect, knock-on effects of healthcare interventions, as with Julia’s worry 
about the impact of treatment side-effects on her economic status and close 
relationships. Value fuzziness may be expected for trade-offs between any qualitatively 
different outcomes, but most strongly in relation to never experienced health statuses. 
Colostomy provides a particularly apposite exemplar as most people will find the 
adversity level of this state impossible to anticipate. 
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i
 Risk decision-making algorithms typically require consequences to be listed before their probabilities and 
values are assessed and expected values added, but the listing process itself relies on unexamined 
intuitive thought processes. 
ii
 As Shakespeare’s Hamlet put it, 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so' (Hamlet, 
Act II, Scene ii). 
iii
 Vaccination programmes against HPV may be expected to reverse this trend (Palefsky, 2010). 
iv
 This phrase will be used to depict the somewhat uncertain relational status of ‘Donald’ who attended 
Julia’s medical consultation. 
v
 Research evidence for increasing prevalence of anal cancer at younger ages was cited in the 
Introduction. Julia would probably not been aware of this trend, and viewed cancer generically as 
predominantly an older person’s disease. 
vi
 Patients with lung cancer have been found to prefer to avoid surgery which would increase their overall 
five year survival chances at the price of an immediate increased risk of death resulting from the 
operation (McNeil, Weichselbaum and Pauker, 1978). 
vii
 The specific information on which Julia based her initial belief that she faced a 50% chance of dying 
from cancer is not known. However, this estimate refers to the generally higher mortality rate for 
colorectal than for anal cancer. Revised diagnosis from the former to the latter generated a substantial 
increase in her estimated chance of survival. 
